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MY DADDY’S NAME IS DONOR: EVALUATING SPERM
DONATION ANONYMITY AND REGULATION
Mark Ballantyne ∗
I. INTRODUCTION

Sperm donation is a multi-billion dollar industry internationally; in the United States alone, sperm banks and fertility centers generate 3.3 billion dollars annually. 1 Despite the size and significance
of the industry, the gamete donation industry is not regulated nationally in the United States. 2 Donors may contribute anonymously,
there are no legal limits on the number of children produced by a given donor, and there are no restrictions on who may be a donor or a
donation recipient. 3 Donor children have been calling for reform,

∗

Third Year Law Student, University of Richmond T.C. Williams School of Law. B.A.
2008 Wake Forest University. J.D. Expected May 2012. For their dedicated assistance in
helping me formulate ideas and edit this comment, I thank Professor Meredith Johnson Harbach, Rachel Reynolds, Emily Sealy, and Jennifer Gimbert.
1
ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, NORVAL D. GLENN & KAREN CLARK, MY DADDY’S NAME IS
DONOR: A NEW STUDY OF YOUNG ADULTS CONCEIVED THROUGH SPERM DONATION, INST.
AM. VALUES 5 (2010), available at http://www.familyscholars.org/assets/Donor_FINAL.pdf.
2
Id.
3
Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National Donor Gamete Databank, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 203, 207 (2009) [hereinafter Cahn, Mandatory Gamete].
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seeking the right to know the identities of their biological fathers and
further regulation of the sperm donation industry. 4
Issues surrounding sperm donation have recently come to
both cultural and legal prominence. In 2010, Focus Features released
a movie titled The Kids are All Right, which tells the story of two
children conceived through artificial insemination who seek out and
build a relationship with their biological father. 5 In 2011, the state of
Washington passed a law requiring the full disclosure of sperm donor
names and medical histories to donor-created children once they turn
eighteen. 6 That same year, the Supreme Court of British Columbia
delivered a landmark decision banning anonymous sperm donation. 7
The court found that the children’s interest in discovering both medical and identifying information about their biological fathers outweighed the donors’ interest in remaining anonymous. 8

4

See Jared Yee, Sperm Donor Children Seek More Respect and Rights, BIOEDGE (Aug. 21,
2010), http://www.bioedge.org/index.php/bioethics/bioethics_article/9160.
5
THE KIDS ARE ALL RIGHT (Alliance Films & Focus Feature Films 2011).
6
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.750 (2011); see also Bonnie Rochman, Where Do (Some) Babies Come From? In Washington, A New Law Bans Anonymous Sperm and Egg Donors,
TIME, July 22, 2011, available at
http://healthland.time.com/2011/07/22/where-do-some-babies-come-from-in-washington-anew-law-bans-anonymous-sperm-and-egg-donors/.
7
Pratten v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), 2011 BCSC 656 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.), available
at http://www.cbc.ca/bc/news/bc-110519-pratten-sperm-donor-ruling.pdf.
8
Id.
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Internationally, countries have been moving towards regulation of sperm and egg donation over the last twenty years. 9 These
regulations include banning anonymous donation, limiting the number of children fathered by a given donor, restricting who can become
a donation recipient, and creating registry systems where children can
uncover information about their biological fathers. 10
In contrast, a lack of national regulation in the United States
permits sperm banks to impose regulations individually on sperm donation. 11 Citing the often-reported psychological struggles of donor
children, some legal analysts have criticized this lack of regulation. 12
These analysts call for a national registry and an end to anonymous
sperm donation. 13 They advocate for regulations addressing the
number of children a donor can create and the information parents
should be providing to their children. 14
Bringing new insight to the debate, the Institute for American
Values released a study titled “My Daddy’s Name is Donor” in

9
Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed Donation is Not the
Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 379, 392 (2009).
10
Id.
11
Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm Donor, 150 Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, at D1.
12
Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 174–75 (2000).
13
See, e.g., Cahn, Mandatory Gamete, supra note 3, at 221.
14
See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Children’s Interests and Information Disclosure: Who Provided
the Egg and Sperm? Or Mommy, Where (and Whom) Do I Come From?, 2 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 1, 4 (2000).
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2011. 15 Through a survey of young adults in America, this study
compares donor children with adopted and biologically raised
peers. 16 The study examines rates of psychological problems, problems with the law, and feelings of incompleteness in donor children. 17 The study also compares donor children who were raised by
heterosexual couples, homosexual couples, and single mothers. 18
Using the data in the study, this comment analyzes proposals
for a national registry system in the United States and for further regulation of the sperm donor industry. While others have written on
this subject, 19 no one has applied the data from “My Daddy’s Name
is Donor” to legal theory. The study, which is the first of its kind, 20
leads to a different proposal regarding sperm donor regulation from
those supplied previously. The United States should implement a national registry system. While donors should have the option to refuse
volunteering identifying information, all donors should be required to
provide updated non-identifying medical information to the registry.
The parents of donor children should have immediate access to donor

15

See generally MARQUARDT ET AL, supra note 1.
Id. at 5.
17
Id.
18
See generally id.
19
See, e.g., Cahn, Mandatory Gamete, supra note 3, at 216–23 (arguing for the United States
to develop a federal registry).
20
MARQUARDT ET AL, supra note 1, at 5.
16
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medical information, and the donor children should be permitted to
access the registry at age sixteen. Along with the registry, the United
States should regulate the number of families that can use donations
from a given donor. However, the study does not provide justification for more intrusive regulation, such as eliminating anonymous
donation, regulating who can be a recipient of sperm donation, or regulating what information parents disclose to their children.
In Part I, this comment explores the debate on anonymous
sperm donation and the current law in the United States. Part II surveys new developments in the regulation of sperm donation internationally and domestically. Part III reviews “My Daddy’s Name is
Donor” and how its findings relate to the anonymity debate. Part IV
concludes with suggestions regarding the national registry and future
regulation of sperm donation in the United States.

II. PROS AND CONS OF DONOR ANONYMITY

The movement in favor of providing donor children access to
information is gaining momentum, as seen both internationally and
domestically in scholarly articles and state legislation. 21 With this
recent trend of challenges to donor anonymity, it is important to un-

21

See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the laws in other countries.
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derstand the basic arguments for and against anonymity. From scholarly review, legislative bodies, and the courts, the arguments for and
against donor anonymity fall into place. While opponents of continued anonymity advocate that children have a right to know their biological fathers, the proponents of anonymity contend that the donor’s
right to privacy trumps the rights of the children. 22
A. The Debate

In deciding whether to release identifying information to donor children, the key issue is whether donor-conceived children’s
right to know identifying information trumps the donor’s right to privacy. 23 The solution depends on whether banning donor anonymity
would actually address the psychological problems faced by donor
children. 24 Some theorists have argued that the donor’s right to pri-

22
Compare HK Jørgensen & Michael A. Fitts, Anonymity in Connection with Sperm Donation, 26 MED. & L. 137, 138–42 (2007) (making arguments for protecting anonymity), with
Elizabeth Marquardt & Leah Ward Sears, Fathers Matter: Anonymous Sperm Donation and
the Age-Old Problem of Father Absence, 4 J. MARSHALL L.J. 113, 134 (2011) (arguing that a
child’s interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interest of the donor), and Kristin E.
Koehler, Artificial Insemination: In the Child’s Best Interest?, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
321,332–34 (1996) (seeking a compromise between the donor’s interests and the child’s interest).
23
Koehler, supra note 22, at 329–30.
24
Id.
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vacy is supreme, while others have suggested the law should provide
information to donor children. 25
Some scholars argue against the elimination of donor anonymity. 26 They suggest that both the donors and the resulting family
have a right to privacy that would be jeopardized by the elimination
of anonymity. 27 Without privacy for donors, these theorists fear donors would be susceptible to unwanted solicitations for affection
from children and legal entanglements brought by mothers seeking
child support and child care. 28 These scholars also worry that eliminating anonymity will reduce the number and quality of sperm donors. 29 The director of one of the oldest sperm banks in the United
States recently stated, “you’re going to lose the really smart, the really wonderful people who I think are going to question . . . ‘Do I really

25
Id. at 329–34. See generally Marquardt & Sears, supra note 22 (arguing that lawmakers
should attempt to minimize father absenteeism by limiting the ability to make anonymous
sperm donations).
26
See generally Pi, supra note 9.
27
See, e.g., id at 390–92.
28
See, e.g., id. at 390–91.
29
Id. at 395; see Alison Motluk, Canadian Court Bans Anonymous Sperm and Egg Donation, NATURE INT’L WKLY J. OF SCI., May 27, 2011, available at
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110527/full/news.2011.329.html.
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want to be in a situation where, down the road, someone may contact
me?’” 30
Additionally, banning anonymity may cause greater psychological damage for donor children if their donor fathers reject them. 31
While stories of donor children seeking their parents are emotionally
touching, in some, if not most instances, the donors may not want to
be found. 32 Many sperm donors in America are college students. 33
These college students are not looking to start a family, but are either
attempting to help another family get started or make some money. 34
They are not trying to create a long-term relationship with their future
children. 35 As these donors move on with their lives and start their
own families, the unexpected presence of an unknown biological
child may be a destabilizing intrusion rather than a welcome addition. 36 This is not true of all donors, and as scholars correctly note,

30

Sperm Donor Ethics, (PBS television broadcast Aug. 25, 2006), transcript available at http://pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/week952/feature.html.

31

Koehler, supra note 22, at 329.
Elizabeth L. Gibson, Artificial Insemination by Donor: Information, Communication and
Regulation, 30 J. FAM. L. 1, 28 (1992).
33
Ryan Ferone, College Students and Sperm Donors, ASKSTUDENT (last visited Jan. 30,
2012), http://www.askstudent.com/sex/college-students-and-sperm-donors/; Allison Brown,
Money Shots: College Students Profit, Help Infertile Couples by Donating Their Sperm and
Eggs, THE DAILY FREE PRESS, Jan. 13, 2004, available at
www.cryobank.com/_resources/pdf/News/DailyFreePressJan04.pdf.
34
Brown, supra note 33.
35
See Ferone, supra note 33; Brown, supra note 33.
36
See David Crary, Sperm-Donors’ Kids Seek more Rights and Respect, MSNBC, Aug. 16,
2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38679526/ns/health-childrens_health/t/sperm-donors32

MY DADDY’S NAME IS DONOR

2012]

577

some donors may be curious about the results of their donations. 37
Still, it is important to consider that while not knowing the identity of
the sperm donor father may be unsettling, the possibility of rejection
by a biological relative may cause more catastrophic results. 38 Without anonymity, some donor children would find themselves in just
this situation.
Nevertheless, some scholars argue against continued donor
anonymity. 39 These scholars use the emotional pleas of donor children as their strongest argument against donor
anonymity. 40 Without anonymity, children could obtain both indentifying and non-identifying information about their fathers once they
reach a certain age. 41 In theory, those donor children could then use
the data to seek out their biological fathers, and attempt to build a relationship with them.42 Numerous news articles and studies detail
donor children’s feelings of incompleteness from not being able to

kids-seek-more-rights-respect/ (telling the story of Lindsay Greenawalt, who has been looking to find her father but has been unable to because “he doesn’t want to make contact” resulting in a psychological toll on her and her mother).
37
See DONOR OFFSPRING/PARENT REGISTRY & FREE SEARCH PAGE,
http://www.amfor.net/DonorOffspring/viewregistry.cgi (last visited Jan. 30, 2012); THE
DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY, https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/ (last visited Jan. 30,
2012).
38
See MARQUARDT ET AL, supra note 1, at 27.
39
E.g. Koehler, supra note 22, at 337–38; Marquardt & Sears, supra note 22, at 137–38.
40
See, e.g., Marquardt & Sears, supra note 22, at 130–31; MARQUARDT ET AL, supra note 1.
41
See Pi, supra note 9, at 393.
42
See id. at 391.
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know the identity of their biological father. 43 For example, Katrina
Clark, who was donor-conceived, relates: “[T]he emptiness came
over me. I realized that I am, in a sense, a freak. I really, truly would
never have a dad. I finally understood what it meant to be donorconceived, and I hated it.” 44 This feeling led her on a search to find
her father and she eventually succeeded. 45 Now, Katrina notes “if I
can't be too attached to him as my father, I'll still always be attached
to the feeling I now have of having a father. I feel more whole now
than I ever have. I love our conversations, even the most trivial
ones.” 46 Without donor anonymity, more donor children could follow Katrina’s path and seek meaningful connections with their biological fathers.
Scholars arguing against anonymity cite the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child, ratified in 1989 (though not by the United
States), 47 which states the child “shall have the right from birth to . . .

43

E.g., Crary, supra note 36; Craig Malisaw, Donor Babies Search for Their Anonymous
Fathers, HOUSTON PRESS, Nov. 5, 2008, available at http://wwwhoustonpress.com/2008-1106/news/donor-babies-search-for-their-anonymous-fathers; Katrina Clark, My Father was an
Anonymous Sperm Donor, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2006, at B1
44
Clark, supra note 43.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47

Jide Nzelibe, Strategic Globalization: International Law As an Extension of Domestic Political Conflict, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 635, 671 (2011) (“In the modern era,
the issues surrounding the Bricker Amendment continue to play out in debates re-
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know and be cared for by his or her parents.” 48 Donor children, they
claim, have a right to know the identity of their biological fathers. 49
Some of these theorists reject the notion that banning anonymity will
decrease the number of donors. 50 They point to studies in the United
Kingdom that show donation numbers have actually increased since
banning anonymity in 2005. 51 Instead, opponents suggest the ban on
anonymity is a chance for the sperm donation industry to revamp its
publicity image and attract new types of donors. 52
These arguments against donor anonymity mirror the arguments for disclosure in the adoption context. 53 Naomi Cahn catalogs
them as follows: first, adult children have a fundamental right to
know about themselves; second, there is no legitimate interest in
withholding birth information from adults; third, withholding birth
information violates equal protection because the children do not

garding ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the U.N.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW).145 For instance, the 2008 Democratic platform endorsed the ratification
of CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.146
By contrast, the 2008 Republican platform vowed to reject the ratification of both
CEDAW and CRC . . . .”)
48

U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448.
See Yee, supra note 4.
50
See UK Sperm Donor Numbers Increase, BBC NEWS (May 3, 2007, 11:12 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6618977.stm.
51
Id.
52
See Cahn, Mandatory Gamete, supra note 3, at 216.
53
See id.
49
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have the same rights as other persons; fourth, allowing courts to decide when to release information could lead to inequitable decision
making; and fifth, children should not be bound by the decisions of
their parents. 54
B. The United States: A Lack of Regulation and Judicial Deference

Through the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(“ASRM”) guidelines, the legislature, and the courts, sperm donation
in America is largely unregulated, undocumented, and anonymous. 55
As the guidelines are advisory, and legislatures and courts have not
imposed further regulation, individual sperm banks impose the majority of rules on donation. 56 With over one hundred sperm banks in
the United States, this system has led to inconsistent and ineffective
regulation of sperm donation. 57
In the United States regulation of sperm donation at a national
level is relatively non-existent. 58 The ASRM sets only advisory
guidelines. 59 Concerning anonymity, the ASRM supports the abilities of sperm donors and families to choose whether to remain ano-

54

Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 206–07.
56
See id. at 207.
57
See Cahn, Mandatory Gamete, supra note 3, at 206; see What is Assisted Reproductive
Technology, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art.
58
See id. at 206–07.
59
See id. at 207.
55
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nymous. 60 The ASRM also recommends that no more than twentyfive children be conceived using the same donor in an area of
800,000 people. 61 Sperm banks may choose whether to impose those
regulations because they are merely advisory. 62 Sperm banks differ
widely in donor regulation: some attempt to acquire and maintain accurate donor health information; 63 some encourage donors to make
non-anonymous donations; 64 and, some avoid regulating any aspect
of sperm donation. 65 By not implementing specific legislation banning anonymous donation, legislatures generally have permitted anonymous donation. 66
Likewise, American courts have refused to second guess legislatures who sever the ties between sperm donors and donor children
through anonymity because there are legitimate interests in encouraging sperm donation and in protecting the donor and the donor children’s family from future unwanted legal entanglements. 67

60

Rochman, supra note 6.
2006 Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo Donation, 86 AM. SOC’Y REPROD. MED. (2006).
62
Cahn, Mandatory Gamete, supra note 3, at 207.
63
Donor Health Updates, NW CRYOBANK, https://www.nwcryobank.com/donor-healthupdates/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
64
EUROPEAN SPERM BANK USA, http://www.europeanspermbankusa.com/ (last visited Dec.
11, 2011).
65
See Mroz, supra note 11.
66
Id.
67
See generally Pi, supra note 9.
61
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American courts have done little to address regulating artificial insemination, and generally support donor anonymity. 68 While
no courts have directly faced the anonymity issue, one court has
come closest to directly upholding donor anonymity. 69 In re K.M.H.,
decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas, involved a sperm donor
seeking joint custody and visitation of the donor children. 70 The
court upheld a Kansas statute permitting anonymity and severing the
paternal link between the sperm donor and donor children. 71 While
the court acknowledged there are “understandable desires of at least
some children conceived through artificial insemination to know the
males from whom they received half of their genes,” 72 the court
noted the legislation was designed to realize “the expectation of unknown or anonymous sperm donors, whether their motive for participation in artificial insemination is altruistic or financial.” 73 In direct
response to the Equal Protection challenge, the court held the statute
served two “legitimate legislative purposes and important governmental objectives:” encouraging men “who are able and willing to

68

See generally id.
See generally In re K.M.H. v. K.C.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007).
70
Id. at 1029.
71
Id. at 1040–41.
72
Id. at 1041.
73
Id.
69
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donate sperm . . . by protecting the men from later unwanted claims
for support from the mothers or the children,” and protecting “women
recipients as well, preventing potential claims of donors to parental
rights and responsibilities.” 74 The court found the legislation to be
constitutional, therefore allowing privacy interests of sperm donors to
trump the interests of donor children. 75
Other courts have discussed the issue when sperm donors
seek parental rights. 76 For instance, in McIntyre v. Crouch, the Oregon Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of a statute
providing that “a child born as a result of artificial insemination shall
have no right, obligation, or interest with respect to the donor.” 77 A
sperm donor seeking visitation attacked the statute as a violation of
due process and equal protection. 78 In response to the equal protection challenge, the court found the statute was rationally related to a
legitimate interest because it strove to “encourage men to donate semen by protecting them against any claims by the mother or the
child.” 79 In another case, Jhordan C. v. Mary K., an American court

74

In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1039 (Kan. 2007).
Id. at 1038.
76
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
77
Id. at 242–43.
78
Id. at 242.
79
Id. at 243.
75
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noted the importance of separating sperm donors from children to
both the recipients and the donors. 80 The court held that anonymous
sperm donation and lack of interference provided “a statutory vehicle
for obtaining semen for artificial insemination without fear that the
donor may claim paternity, and has likewise provided men with a statutory vehicle for donating semen . . . without fear of liability for
child support.” 81
In contrast to the general trend, one American court has suggested that a change to anonymous donation may be on the horizon. 82
In Johnson v. Superior Court, a California appellate court recognized
a limited privacy interest for sperm donors. 83 With a showing of
good cause, the court suggested it would disclose a donor’s identity; 84 good cause could be demonstrated in the case of medical necessity. 85 The application of this case is limited, however, as the court
makes these statements in dicta. 86 The court also stops short of ad-

80

Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
Id.
82
See generally Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 2000).
83
Id. at 876.
84
Id. at 874.
85
Id. at 875.
86
Id. at 1066.
81
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dressing the debate regarding identifying information and the psychological needs (as opposed to medical needs) of donor children. 87

III. CHANGES IN THE LAW: A MOVEMENT TOWARDS BANNING
ANONYMITY AND REGULATION

While the lack of national regulation in America has fostered
an active debate regarding the positives and negatives of anonymity
and the regulation of sperm donation, courts and legislatures around
the world have deliberately taken steps to ban anonymity and regulate
gamete donation. 88 To some degree, this movement has infiltrated
the United States, as the State of Washington's legislature recently
enacted new legislation that takes a step towards banning anonymous
sperm donation. 89 These changes signify a movement away from
anonymity and towards the regulation of sperm donation that traverses geographical and cultural lines.
A. Changes Internationally

87

Id. at 1069.
See Lucy Frith, Gamete Donation and Anonymity, The Ethical and Legal Debate, 16
HUMAN REPROD. 818, 821 (2001).
89
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.750 (2011). See Rochman, supra note 6.
88
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Internationally, countries have been moving away from anonymous donation over the past decade. 90 A Canadian court recently
banned donor anonymity, reasoning that the interest of the donor
child was more important than a donor’s right to remain anonymous. 91 In Europe, a directive by the European Union has sparked a
variety of new regulations regarding artificial insemination. 92 These
changes, along with anti-anonymity regulations already in place in
Australia and New Zealand, demonstrate a growing global movement
against anonymous gamete donation. 93
In a groundbreaking case, the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Canada, recently delivered an opinion banning anonymous
90

See, e.g., Eric Blyth & Lucy Frith, Donor-Conceived People’s Access to Genetic and Biographical History: An Analysis of Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting Disclosure of Donor Identity, 23 INTL. J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 174, 177 (2009).
91
Pratten v. British Columbia, 2011 BCSC 656, para.111(h) (Can.), available at
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/11/06/2011BCSC0656cor1.htm.
92
Council Directive 2004/23/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 102), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:102:0048:0058:en:PDF; see, e.g., Tànaiste
signs Regulations to transpose Directive 2004/23/EC on Quality and Safety of Tissues and
Cells, AN RONN SLÀINTE, http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2006/20060418.html (describing Ireland’s adoption of the European Parliament’s Directive 2004/23/EC governing standards for the quality and safety of tissue cells).
93
Assistive Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) div 3 pt 19(a) (Austl.) (codifying Victoria’s ban on anonymous donation); Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) div 4
pt 30 (1-2) (Austl.) (codifying the New South Wales ban on anonymous donation); Human
Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) div 5 pt 44(1)(a-b) (Austl.) (codifying Western
Australia’s ban on anonymous donation); Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act
2004 cl. 47, 50 (N.Z.) (codifying New Zealand’s ban on anonymous donation); see also Eric
Blyth & Lucy Frith, Donor-Conceived People’s Access to Genetic and Biographical History: An Analysis of Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting Disclosure of Donor
Identity, 23 INTL. J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 174, 176 (2009). But see Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Parliament of Australia, Report on Donor Conception Practices in
Australia (2011) 2.2 (highlighting that while three Australian states have codified the ban on
anonymous donation, the states of Queensland, Tasmania, the Northern Territory, and the
Australian Capital Territory lack any legislation governing donor conception).
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donation. 94 In support of the decision that anonymous sperm donation was harmful to the child, and it is not in the best interest of donor
offspring, Madam Justice Adair highlighted both physical and mental
health problems as a result of anonymity. 95 First, the court concluded
that anonymous donation compromises the child’s health by denying
a useful medical history, creating the potential for in-breeding with
half-siblings and by potentially delaying medical treatment. 96 The
court found these reasons justified, mandating the release of nonidentifying information. 97 Second, the court recognized that donor
children have a psychological need for identifying information to
complete their personal identity and eliminate the “stress, anxiety, . . .
frustration,” sadness, and depression experienced by many donor
children. 98 Third, the court noted that while parents have an “important and legitimate interest in deciding what their children know and
when [they] know it,” secrecy and anonymity can have “devastating
effects . . . when the truth is finally revealed.” 99 For these three rea-

94

Pratten v. British Columbia, 2011 BCSC 656, para. 335(c) (Can.), available at
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/11?06?2011BCSC065corl.htm.
95
Id. at para. 111 (c-d).
96
Id. at para. 111 (b), (f).
97
Id. at para. 215.
98
Id. at para 111 (d-e).
99
Id. at para 111 (g-h).
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sons, the court rejected regulations enabling anonymous sperm donation. 100
Other countries disagree whether to permit anonymous sperm
donation. 101 Like the United States, some countries permit anonymous donation. 102 For instance, sperm donors in Iceland can choose to
remain anonymous. 103 Other countries, such as Sweden, Austria,
Switzerland, parts of Australia, New Zealand, Holland, and the United Kingdom recently have banned anonymous donation. 104

100

Pratten v. British Columbia, 2011 BCSC 656, para. 215 (Can.), available at
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/11?06?2011BCSC065corl.htm.
101
Compare Andrew Vorzimer, Ireland to Ban Anonymous Donation?, THE SPIN DOCTOR
BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.eggdonor.com/blog/2012/01/30/ireland-ban-anonymousdonation/ (highlighting Ireland’s current absence of legislation banning donor anonymity
and legislation that is currently being considered to implement such a ban), with Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, cl 47, 50 (N.Z.) (codifying New Zealand’s ban on
anonymous donation).
102
Rita Rubin, Personality of a Sperm Donor–Study Offers First Clues, MSNBC.COM (Oct.
24, 2011, 9:34:19), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44979426/ns/health-mens_health/t/personality-sperm-donor-study-offers-first-clues/ (explaining that United States
still has no national ban on sperm donor anonymity); see, e.g., Vorizmer, supra note 101
(explaining that, for now, Ireland still allows anonymous donation).
103
Act on Artificial Fertilisation and Use of Human Gametes and Embryos for Stem-Cell
Research (Act No. 55/1996), Art. 4 (Ice.), available at http:// eng.velferdarraduneyti.is/actsof-Parliament/nr/20092.
104
FORTPFLAMZUNGSMEDIZINGESETZ, [Reproductive Medicine Act], BUNDESGESETZBLATT I
[BGBL I] No.275/1992 (Austria) (codifying Austria’s ban on anonymous donation); 6 ch. 7
§Genetic Integrity Act (SCS 2006:351) (Swed.) (codifying Sweden’s ban on donor anonymity); Assistive Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) div 3 pt 19(a) (Austl.) (codifying Victoria’s ban on anonymous donation); Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) div
4 pt 30 (1-2) (Austl.) (codifying the New South Wales ban on anonymous donation); Human
Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) div 5 pt 44(1)(a-b) (Austl.)(codifying Western
Australia’s ban on anonymous donation); Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting (Law
on data from donors for artificial reproduction), Stb. 2002, p. 240 (Neth.) (codifying the
Netherlands’ ban on anonymous donation); Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act
2004 cl. 47, 50 (N.Z.) (codifying New Zealand’s ban on anonymous donation); AS 3068
(2000) (Switz.) (codifying Switzerland’s ban on anonymous donation); Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act 1990, 1990 c. 37 (U.K.) (codifying the United Kingdom’s ban on anonymous donation).
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Some countries have attempted to attack gamete donation issues by increasing regulation. 105 Spurred by the 2004 European Parliament directive concerning human tissue regulation, many European countries have begun implementing regulations on sperm
donation. 106 The United Kingdom set a limit of ten families that
could use a given donor. 107 Denmark limited donors from creating
more than one pregnancy per two hundred thousand citizens in the
patient’s country. 108 Sweden capped donations from a single donor
to six couples. 109 Additionally, Sweden’s Genetic Integrity Act of
2006 prohibits single women from receiving sperm. 110 In Austria, no
more than three couples may use the gametes of a given donor. 111
The movement to regulate sperm donation extends beyond Europe as
well. For example, in Hong Kong, only three children may be born

105

Robert Cook-Deegan, What Policies Govern Egg Donation?, STANFORD IN WASHINGTON
SEMINAR AND TUTORIAL,
http://www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/reprotech/New%20Ways%20of%20Making
%20Babies/eggpol.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
106
See generally, Council Directive 2004/23/EC, 2004 O.J. (L102), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:102:0048:0058:en:PDF.
107
HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/ (last visited
Feb. 19, 2012).
108
CRYOS DENMARK, http://dk.cryosinternational.com/home.aspx#7689 (last visited Feb. 19,
2012).
109
See, e.g., SAHLGRENSKA UNIVERSITESTSSJUKHUSET, Gynekologi Och Reproducktionsmedicin,
http://www.sahlgrenska.se/upload/SU/omrade_oss/reproduktionsmedicin/Spermadonatorinfo
rmation.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
110
LAG OM GENETISK INTEGRITET [Act on Genetic Integrity] 6 ch.1 § (Svensk föfattningssamling [SFS] 2006:351) (Swed.), available at
http://www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/20060351.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
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from a given donor’s sperm. 112 As seen by the new regulations in
North America, Europe, and Asia, 113 the movement away from donor
anonymity and towards regulation of gamete donation spans across
geographical and cultural boundaries.
B. A New Act in the State of Washington

Consistent with the trend internationally, the state of Washington’s legislature recently inched towards banning anonymous donation in new legislation. 114 Previously, Washington sperm banks
had been accepting anonymous donations, but the sperm donor could
elect to reveal his information to future children. 115 The new law
flips this burden. 116 When the donor makes his donation, his full
name and medical information will be disclosed to his children at age
eighteen unless the donor opts out and elects not to disclose that information. 117 This legislation suggests America may be more willing
to fall in line with the international retreat from anonymous donation.

112

Human Reproductive Technology (Licensing) Regulation, (2007) Cap. 561A, 6,
§15(2)(a)(ii) (H.K.); see also Cahn, supra note 111, at 84.
113
Cahn, supra note 111, at 83–84.
114
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115
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Upon closer inspection, the legislation does not make much of a practical impact. There are two sperm banks in Washington. 118 At one
sperm bank, three-fourths of donors request to remain anonymous,
and the new legislation will allow those donors to continue to choose
anonymity. 119 The other sperm bank accepts only “open-Id” donors. 120 Open-Id donors are donors who agree to make themselves
available for contact from children once those children reach the age
of 18. 121 Over recent years, less than one percent of those donors
have inquired about remaining anonymous. 122 Therefore, the act
seems more of a legislative statement rather than a practical transformation of Washington’s artificial insemination practices. Nonetheless, this new legislation coupled with the current global trend towards donor regulation suggests America may be on the edge of
banning donor anonymity.

118
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Id.
120
Rochman, supra note 6.
121
Open or ID Release Donors, SPERMCENTER, Sept. 9, 2009,
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IV. TESTING THEORY WITH DATA: “MY DADDY’S NAME IS DONOR” STUDY

With such a large international movement towards regulation
of sperm donation and banning anonymity, it is now crucial to examine the implications of such a ban. A new study analyzing the
psychological impact of being donor-conceived has shed new light on
the arguments for and against donor anonymity, and whether those
theoretical arguments have a factual basis in data. 123 This study, “My
Daddy’s Name is Donor”, is the first study to investigate in-depth the
psychological effect of being donor children. 124 The study surveys a
pool of approximately 500 donor children raised by single mothers,
lesbian couples, and heterosexual couples, and compares those responses with the responses of adopted children and children raised by
two biological parents. 125 The study suggests that increased psychological problems in donor children are correlated with, but not necessarily caused by, four factors: the practice of artificial insemination
itself, anonymous donation, family structure, and full disclosure of
method of conception. 126

123

MARQUARDT ET AL, supra note 1, at 5.
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125
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First, the study reveals artificial insemination itself may be
detrimental to donor children. 127 Generally, “My Daddy’s Name is
Donor” shows that donor children statistically lead more troubled
lives than adopted children or biologically raised children. 128 The
study finds that a higher number of donor children (compared with
adopted or biological children) fear being related to a potential sexual
partner, feel sad when they see friends with their biological parents,
and are more suspicious their parents are hiding something from
them. 129 The study also found donor children are more likely to have
problems with the law, are more likely to have mental health problems, including depression, and are more likely to experience substance abuse. 130 Forty-five percent of donor children are troubled by
the donor process itself and are disturbed that money was involved
with their conception. 131 The study paints an image of donor children
as more hurt, more confused, and more isolated than similar young
adults in their generation who were raised as adoptees or by biological parents. 132
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Second, the study suggests that donor children disfavor anonymous donation. 133 For instance, the study finds over two-thirds of
donor children wonder what their donor’s family is like. 134 Approximately two-thirds of the donor children support the right to know information about the biological father, including medical history and
identity, and information about the existence and identity of halfsiblings. 135 Two-thirds personally want the opportunity to get to
know both their donor and their half-siblings. 136 Without donor anonymity, donor children would be able to fulfill some of these desires. 137
On the other hand, the study also suggests that banning anonymity could cause greater harm in donor children in some circumstances. 138 The study shows that a majority of donor children wonder
if their donor’s families would even want to know them. 139 More
than half of the donor children surveyed agree, “I have worried that if
I try to get more information about or have a relationship with my
sperm donor, my mother and/or the father who raised me would feel
133

See, e.g., id. at 27 (describing Joanna Rose, a donor offspring who fought to end anonymous donation in Britian).
134
Id. at 28.
135
Id. at 11–12.
136
Id.
137
See generally, e.g., id.
138
See id. at 57.
139
Id. at 28.
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angry or hurt.” 140 Seventy percent agree, “I find myself wondering
what my sperm donor’s family is like,” and sixty-nine percent agree,
“I sometimes wonder if my sperm donor’s parents would want to
know me.” 141
Third, the study reveals donor children whose parents attempt
to conceal the circumstances of their conception may experience increased psychological problems. 142 When parents lie or attempt to
conceal that the child was donor-conceived, donor children face
higher rates of depression, mental health problems, substance abuse,
and problems with the law. 143
Finally, “My Daddy’s Name is Donor” demonstrates that
family structure may influence the psychological health of the donor
children. 144 If the donor child was raised by a single mother, some
categories are significantly worse for that child, including: children
who wonder what their donor’s family is like, children who have
been in trouble with the law by age twenty-five, children who expe-

140
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rience mental health problems, and children who have a history of
substance abuse. 145
When all four variables are considered together, only two significant areas remain which are solely attributable to anonymous donation: the children’s desire to know the identities of their genetic
half-siblings, and the desire to know the identity of their biological
father. 146 Depression, mental health, and substance abuse in children
are all at least partially correlated to the upbringing of the donor
children, and not necessarily attributable to anonymity. 147 While
“My Daddy’s Name is Donor” certainly highlights the psychological
problems that accompany donor children, it is less clear that these
problems are tied, or could be cured by, eliminating donor anonymity. 148
Ultimately, the study is inconclusive as to whether donor anonymity is a predominant factor in the increased psychological problems of donor children. 149 The study suggests anonymity may be a
contributing factor in the problems of donor children; however, the

145

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11–12.
147
See id. at 12–13.
148
Id. at 59.
149
Id. at 56–57 (explaining the complications of assessing whether psychological issues
come from donor anonymity or simply from being a donor child).
146

2012]

MY DADDY’S NAME IS DONOR

597

study also shows it is not the only factor. 150 The study suggests it is
also important for the donor child’s family to be truthful about the
conception, and for the child to be raised in a two-parent environment
(either with a heterosexual or homosexual household) rather than by a
single mother. 151 It is unclear whether the effect of eliminating donor
anonymity would be sufficiently positive for children to outweigh the
costs imposed by invading the privacy of donors. 152

V. PROPOSAL OF A NEW UNITED STATES DONOR REGISTRY

“My Daddy’s Name is Donor,” sheds new light on when children’s
right to information is so important that it should outweigh the donor’s right to privacy. 153 In deciding whether and how to regulate
sperm donation, the key issue is whether the children’s right to information trumps the donor’s right to privacy. 154 Courts and legislatures should impose regulations when sperm donation practices are
proven to cause direct psychological harm to donor children. “My
Daddy’s Name is Donor” describes how artificial insemination itself

150

Id. at 56–59.
Id. at 10–11.
152
See id. at 64–67 (highlighting the types of confusion donor offspring feel about donor
conception).
153
See generally, id.
154
Compare id. at 61–62 (describing the child’s right to know information about their donor
parent, with id. at 62–64 (describing the donor’s right to keep their information private).
151
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may be psychologically harmful to donor children, and the possible
individual causes of that harm. 155 Based on the study, which suggests donor children encounter greater struggles than adopted or biologically raised children, the United States clearly needs some form
of donor registry to help curb those detrimental effects. 156 The registry should be designed to provide medical information to all donor
children, discourage any fears of an accidental incestuous relationship, and minimize the psychological harm experienced by donorconceived children.
The selection of the appropriate registry turns on what type of
information is necessary to the health of donor children, and whether
the registry should be national or more localized. Donors should only
be required to disclose the type of information that has been shown to
cause psychological damage in donor offspring. Additionally, the registry should be large enough in scope to be effective, while not overly burdensome or unrealistic.
Applying the data in “My Daddy’s Name is Donor” to the registry
systems proposed by other scholars and implemented in other coun-

155
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Id. at 37–38.
Id.
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tries, 157 I conclude the United States should institute a national registry of sperm donors and sperm donor children. Donors should have
the choice whether to volunteer their indentifying information. While
donors would not be required to provide identifying information, they
should be forced to provide updated medical information to the registry. Parents of donor children should have immediate access to this
information, and the donor children should be able to access the registry at age sixteen. Finally, through the registry, the United States
should limit the number of families who can use a given donor’s
sperm; however, the United States should not regulate who can receive sperm or when parents should tell the children about their method of conception. I examine each issue below.
A. Volunteering Identifying Information Disclosure

The most important issue in establishing the registry is
whether the donor should be required, or have the option, to provide
identifying information. Requiring the donor to disclose identifying
information would effectively ban anonymous donation in the United
States. Identifying information could include some combination of
the donor’s name, current address, contact information, family infor-

157

Id. at 29–30.
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mation (such as marital status and number of children), education
level, employment, and any personal message to be given to the donor’s children. 158 With this identifying information, the children
could find their donors and attempt to establish a relationship. As
“My Daddy’s Name is Donor” does not prove a clear causal link between donor anonymity and psychological health problems in children, donors should have the choice whether to keep their identities
anonymous. 159
Without the registry, the current system in the United States
permits sperm banks individually to determine the permissibility of
anonymous donation. 160 While the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973
provided “all papers and records pertaining to the insemination . . .
are subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good
cause shown,” 161 this language is not found in the 2002 Uniform Parentage Act. 162 No state in the United States forbids anonymous do-

158

See, e.g., Xytex Sperm Donor Bank Patient Information, XYTEX CRYO INTERNATIONAL
SPERM BANK, http://www.xytex.com/sperm-donor-bank-patient/index.cfm#donoroptions
(detailing one sperm bank’s “Information Options” for different amounts of information that
donors can give; this example provides a sample of what kinds of information those obtaining sperm are interested in having).
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MARQUARDT ET AL supra note 1, at 56.
160
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http://www.choicemoms.org/choosing_a_sperm_bank/42 (explaining that each United States
sperm bank makes its own decisions about requiring or allowing anonymity).
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See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002).
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nation. 163 Without any guidance, the sperm banks make the choice
whether to permit anonymous donation. 164
Legal scholars have debated the merits of banning anonymous
donation, and have reached different conclusions. 165 Naomi Cahn, an
advocate for banning donor anonymity, argues the release of a donor’s identifying information should be mandatory. 166 Cahn also
suggests donors could include a “no contact” message for their children. 167 Cahn argues banning anonymity would benefit children by
minimizing the possibility of accidental donor-children incest, limiting the number of children produced by one donor, and satisfying the
strong interest of donor children to have access to identifying information, thereby helping the children to discover a psychological and
emotional sense of identity. 168
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MARQUARDT ET AL, supra note 1, at 52.
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On the other hand, Mary Byrn and Rebecca Ireland reject
banning donor anonymity. 169 They argue a ban on donor anonymity
would be unconstitutional because it would assume “that the fundamental rights to procreate and to raise one’s child are less robust for
persons who conceive [through assisted reproductive technology]
than they are for persons who conceive through sexual reproduction.” 170 At the far end of the spectrum, Glenn Cohen rejects a ban
on donor anonymity and a registry system entirely. 171
While “My Daddy’s Name is Donor” demonstrates a correlation between anonymous donation and psychological problems, it
does not prove causation because there are other variables that could
also be responsible for those problems. 172 At this time, anonymity
has not been shown to cause psychological problems in donor children. 173
“My Daddy’s Name is Donor” shows a clear correlation between donor anonymity and psychological problems in donor child-
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ren. 174 Donor anonymity is correlated with donor children’s desire to
know information about their father, a feeling of missing some sense
of self, heightened depression, substance abuse, and problems with
the law by age twenty-five. 175
Correlation does not always indicate causation, 176 but statisticians may make the leap in the absence of other explanations for a result. 177 “My Daddy’s Name is Donor” reveals other potential explanations for heightened psychological distress in donor children:
artificial insemination, family structure, and concealment of their method of conception. 178 Claims of psychological harm in donor children seem far more complex than previously suggested. 179 To some
degree, all donor children experience psychological problems, not only children with anonymous donors. 180 Higher rates of psychological
problems, drug abuse, problems with the law, and depression are also
consistent among donor children who were raised by a single mother
or who were shielded from the truth about their method of concep-
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tion. 181 These other explanations limit “My Daddy’s Name is Donor” from proving a causal link between donor anonymity and psychological problems in donor children. 182
Now we must weigh this speculative harm against the problems intertwined with eliminating anonymity. If anonymity is the
cause of depression, substance abuse, and unlawful behavior in donor
children, the donor’s right to privacy would be lesser than the donor
children’s interest in identifying information. 183 If, however, anonymity only causes the donor children to want to know their biological father, the donor’s right to privacy should overcome the children’s desire for information. 184 “My Daddy’s Name is Donor” does
not establish a causal connection between donor anonymity and psychological problems in donor children. 185 Therefore, the donor children’s interest in identifying information does not trump the donor’s
interest in privacy, and the registry should not require that sperm donors provide identifying information.
By permitting but not requiring donors to provide identifying
information, the registry would be optimal for sperm donors. Donors
181

Id. at 44–45.
See What is the Difference Between Causation and Correlation?, supra note 178.
183
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184
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185
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182

2012]

MY DADDY’S NAME IS DONOR

605

who wish to know their children can provide information that would
be accessible to the children; donors who wish to avoid future contact
can choose to remain anonymous. The voluntary nature of providing
information would also allow donors to decide later in life to make
information available to their children or retract their identifying information. They would not be bound by their decision at the time of
donation. Suppose a college student makes the decision to donate
sperm for some extra spending money. At the time, information disclosure seems harmless. However, the donor may feel differently if
he eventually has a family of his own. Without a system of voluntary
disclosure, the donor would have no way to conceal his identifying
information. If children seek out the donor, he may meet them with
hostility and rejection, rather than hospitality and open arms. An outright ban on donor anonymity could lead to significant issues for both
the donor and the donor children.
Additionally, voluntary disclosure of identifying information
would provide benefits to donor children. Donor children would be
assured that their donor actually wants to be found if the donor provides identifying information, alleviating the anxiety of potential re-
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jection displayed in “My Daddy’s Name is Donor.” 186 While some
children would not be able to contact their biological father, the lack
of contact may be less psychologically detrimental than tracking
down a biological father who wishes to remain anonymous.
Finally, permitting anonymous sperm donation would help
ensure a continued, adequate supply of sperm. A ban on anonymous
donation may decrease the number of sperm donors. People feared
such a decrease in British Columbia 187 and in England 188 after the
banning of anonymous donation. Under the present system, a decrease in the number of sperm donors in the United States would not
concern sperm banks, as sperm banks generate large profits by using
one donor’s sperm to inseminate many different women. 189 For example, The New York Times reported one donor fathered 150 children. 190 However, if the numbers of families who can use a given donor are limited, as proposed later in this article, a decreased number
of sperm donors could lead to an insufficient supply of sperm to satisfy the demands of potential mothers.
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189
Mroz, supra note 11, at 1.
190
Id.
187

2012]

MY DADDY’S NAME IS DONOR

607

American courts and legislatures should be cautious about
banning donor anonymity outright until there is a causal connection
between anonymity and psychological problems in donor children.
Allowing donors the choice to volunteer identifying information to
the registry would benefit sperm donors, donor children, and the
sperm donation industry. Without such a causal connection, the donor children’s right to identifying information does not trump the donor’s right to privacy. “My Daddy’s Name is Donor” does not prove
a causal connection between donor anonymity and psychological
problems in donor children; 191 thus, donors should be permitted, but
not required, to volunteer identifying information to the registry.
B. Mandatory Disclosure of Updated Medical Information

While donors should be allowed to choose to keep their identifying information confidential, they should be required to make
their updated medical history available to children through the registry. Donor children’s interest in obtaining medical information
should overcome the donor’s right to privacy concerns if obtaining
medical information relates directly to the children’s health. Medical, non-identifying information includes all medical records neces-

191

See MARQUARDT ET AL, supra note 1, at 57.
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sary for a doctor to assess a donor child’s health and to treat the child
in the case of illness or an emergency. 192 This information would include blood type, personal history of surgeries and illnesses, family
history of illnesses, and health updates. Donor children have a heightened interest in obtaining this medical information because such information directly impacts their health; conversely, providing medical information only minimally infringes on the donor’s privacy.
Therefore, consistent with the views of other legal scholars, donors
should be required to provide updated medical information to the registry. 193
Unlike the active debate regarding the disclosure of identifying information, most legal scholars support mandatory disclosure of
medical information to donor children. 194 In addition to the scholars
mentioned above that advocate for full disclosure of both identifying
and medical information, Kristin Koehler recommends mandatory
disclosure for only medical and physical donor information. 195 This
more limited mandatory disclosure requirement, she argues, strikes a

192

Non-Identifying Medical Information, QUEENSLAND GOV’T, available at
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balance between the child’s search for a sense of identity and the donor’s interest in preserving anonymity. 196 Scholars generally support
requiring sperm donors to disclose medical information to children. 197
With medical, non-identifying information, the interest of the
donor children to information clearly outweighs the donor’s privacy
interest; thus, donors should be required to provide and update medical information to the registry. First, donor children have a heightened interest in obtaining their family medical histories because
knowing such information can directly affect their physical health.
Medical histories can give doctors the insight they need to accurately
diagnose a life-threatening illness. 198 In the case of emergency,
where the line between life and death can be a matter of minutes,
lacking such information can cause delay and lead to catastrophic
consequences. 199 Accordingly, the donor child has a strong interest
in obtaining the donor’s medical history.

196
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Second, providing medical information only minimally infringes on a donor’s privacy. As suggested in Johnson v. Superior
Court, when dealing with the disclosure of medical information, the
donor has a limited right to privacy because the medical information
is so important to the child. 200 Even without the limited privacy
right, the release of non-identifying medical information does not
compromise the donor’s privacy. 201 Donor children cannot find or
contact the donor with non-identifying medical information alone. 202
A simple system of assigning numbers to donors and donor children
could prevent any inadvertent disclosures of the donor’s identity
when the children seek medical information. Therefore, the donor
children’s high interest in obtaining medical information overcomes
the donor’s low interest in privacy. Donors should be required to
provide medical information to the registry, and update that information if later diagnosed with a genetically transmitted disease.
The national mandatory medical registry would serve one last
crucial function: the release of the identity of donor siblings. “My
Daddy’s Name is Donor” highlights that donor children are largely
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concerned with unintentionally entering a sexual relationship with a
biologically related person. 203 While statistics are unavailable on the
actual frequency of such accidental incest, the fear itself seen in donor children is problematic. 204 Through the donor’s file, and the donor children attached to that file, donor children will have the option
of making their information known to the other donor children conceived from the same donor. While the choice to access this information about half-siblings would be the children’s, this choice would allow most children to know at least their donor siblings (though
admittedly, this does not solve the problem if the donor has a family
and naturally conceives children later in life). The disclosure of the
identity of the donor siblings should drastically reduce the chances of
unintentional biological relationships, and thereby alleviate some of
the concerns and pressures on donor children.
C. A National Registry

With the decision to have a registry containing medical history information for all donor children and donor identifying information for some donor children, practical issues arise regarding the implementation of the registry. For instance, we must determine the
203
204

Mroz, supra note 11.
Id.
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appropriate scope of the registry. Should the registry be international, national, state, or local? Current registries in the United States
vary in scope. 205 International legal strategies and scholarship suggest the benefits of a national registry. 206 The United States should
implement a national registry because a national registry would provide the greatest benefit to both donors and their children.
Registries already implemented in other countries, along with
proposals from other legal scholars, suggest a preference for a national registry. 207 First, of the countries who have implemented registries, most have done so on a national scale. 208 New Zealand, 209
Sweden, 210 and the United Kingdom 211 have all created national registries, while Australia has a state-by-state donor registry with differ-
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ent registries in Victoria 212 and Western Australia. 213 Second, legal
scholarship supports the implementation of a national registry. 214
Naomi Cahn recommends a national registry to prevent donors from
making donations at multiple sperm banks and to provide children
optimal access to information. 215 The trend, supported both internationally and by legal scholars suggests the benefits of a national registry system. 216
While legal scholars and other countries suggest a national
registry as the best option, 217 the practical impossibility of an international registry and the insufficiency of a state or local registry make
implementing a national registry the only feasible option. Theoretically, an international database would seem to make sense. In an age
of available international travel and communication, an international
database could enable connections between children in the United
States and donors overseas. Without an international database, children whose parents imported the sperm from another country would

212
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still encounter difficulties in obtaining information. Exporting sperm
is a booming business in some European countries. 218 For example,
Cryos, a sperm bank in Denmark, ships to over sixty-five nations, has
enabled over 18,000 pregnancies in the last twenty years, and maintains at least 500 sperm donors on stock for their customers’ selection. 219 The site even provides baby pictures of the donors. 220 However, an international sperm bank is practically impossible. An
international sperm bank would require multi-national consensus regarding data storage, anonymity laws, and sperm distribution regulation. 221 Attempting such a consensus would be a political nightmare
because regulation of sperm donation varies greatly throughout Europe, Asia, and Australia; countries differ in the number of children
per donor, anonymity, and the permitted recipients of sperm donation. 222 While an international registry would be ideal for sperm donor children, implementing an international registry is not realistic.
At the other end of the spectrum, registries at local and state
levels would not adequately alleviate the burden on donor children.
As the states and local governments are more in touch with the
218
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220
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people of that state than the federal government, a state-by-state registry would permit more targeted regulation and reporting. Unfortunately, a local or state registry would be less effective at helping donor children. Without a national registry, donors who move from the
donation state would likely stop reporting their new contact information to the registry, as the more burdensome task would discourage
updating information. The children would then have the increased
burden of determining which state the donation was made, and engaging in an investigative process to track their donor from state to
state. 223 As one goal of the registry is to effectively distribute information to donor children to help alleviate the psychological strains of
being donor-conceived, a state or local registry system is inadequate.
A national registry would be the most beneficial for donor
children, without imposing too much of a burden on the political
process. With the availability of long distance transportation and
communication, donors have the ability to freely move from state to
state. A national registry would enable children to find their donors
across state lines. Similarly, the burden on donors would be diminished as they could provide updated information at a convenient lo-
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cal location that would then be transferred to the national databank.
As an international registry is practically impossible and a state or local registry is inadequate, the United States should adopt a national
registry for the benefit of the donors and donor children.
Other practical issues in implementing the registry include
funding, effective implementation, and monitoring. Those issues will
not be discussed in detail in this comment. 224
D. Regulations accompanying the implementation of the registry

“My Daddy’s Name is Donor” suggests the donor children
could benefit from some national regulation. 225 With the implemen-

224

In my opinion, another issue is how to operate and fund the national registry.
The maintenance of a national registry would be expensive. The registry would
need a data center for information storage, staffed branch locations throughout the
country to collect updated medical and geographical information from donors, and
staff to handle requests for, and distribution of, information to donor children. I
believe funding the registry should turn on who benefits from the registry, who has
the ability to pay for such a registry, and providing incentive for the registry to be
run effectively. There are three possibilities for registry funding: the sperm donor
children, the government through taxpayer dollars, or the sperm banks. Sperm donor children should not be required to fund the national donor registry because they
did not make a voluntary choice to be donor-conceived and they do not have the
ability to fund the registry. Likewise, the burden of funding the registry should not
be placed on American taxpayers because they only indirectly benefit from the registry and lack the ability to pay. It would make the most sense for sperm banks to
fund the national registry. Sperm banks have the ability to pay, and would derive
direct benefit from the implementation of the registry.
If sperm banks run and fund the registry, it is unclear whether sperm banks
would have adequate incentive to promote and run the registry effectively. A government system of monitoring and penalties could incentivize sperm banks to run
the registry effectively. The registry’s effectiveness would depend on sperm banks
to encourage donors to volunteer identifying information and update the medical
information.
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tation of a national registry, the United States could regulate sperm
donation in a similar fashion with countries around the world. Potential regulation should be geared to address the children’s concerns
found in “My Daddy’s Name is Donor”: accidental incest, family
structure, and disclosure of the method of conception. 226 Potential
regulations could include how many children could be conceived by
one donor, who may be a recipient of sperm donation, and when parents should disclose the method of conception to their children.
While the United States should regulate the number of families who
can use a given donor, the United States should not regulate who can
receive artificial insemination or when parents should tell the children they are donor conceived.
1. Limiting the Number of Families Who Can Use a Donor

Currently, the United States does not limit the number of
children who may be conceived by a single donor. 227 The ASRM
suggests no more than twenty-five children should be conceived by a
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single donor in a population of 800,000. 228 This mere suggestion
does little to dissuade sperm banks from using one donor many times
to generate high profits. 229 Over-using one sperm donor increases the
chance of accidental incest and rare disease distribution. 230 Consistent with the trend in other countries, by regulating the number of
families who can use a given donor, the United States could alleviate
some of the donor children’s concerns displayed in “My Daddy’s
Name is Donor.” 231
Countries around the world limit the number of times a donor
may be used in two ways: either limiting the number of families that
can use the donor, or limiting the number of children the donor may
conceive.

232

Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, the

Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland, regulate the number of
children one donor may conceive. 233 The number of children allowed ranges from three (Hong Kong) to twenty-five (Denmark). 234
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Other countries, such as New Zealand, Sweden, parts of Australia,
and the United Kingdom regulate the number of families that can use
a donor. 235 The number of permitted families ranges from four (New
Zealand) 236 to ten (United Kingdom). 237
In support of limiting the usage of one sperm donor, “My
Daddy’s Name is Donor” highlights that donor children are highly
concerned about unintentionally entering into a sexual relationship
with a biological relative. 238 Forty-six percent of donor children,
compared with seventeen percent of adopted adults and six percent of
adults raised by biological parents, fear being attracted to a relative. 239 Similarly, forty-three percent of donor children, compared
with sixteen percent of adopted adults and nine percent of adults
raised by biological parents, fear having sexual relations with a rela-
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tive. 240 These findings demonstrate a heightened fear of accidental
incest in donor children. 241
However, with a national registry in place, donor children
should have the option to discover the identity their half-siblings,
which would alleviate some of the incest concerns found in “My
Daddy’s Name is Donor.” 242 Donor children, just like their donors
fathers, would have the option of volunteering their identifying information to the national registry so half-siblings could find them.
While donor children would still risk accidental incest if the donor
fathered children outside the artificial insemination context, disclosure of the identities of donor siblings would drastically reduce the
chance of accidental incest.
In addition to the functions of the national registry, the United
States should also alleviate incest concerns by regulating the number
of families that can use a given sperm donor. Such regulation would
also control the dissemination of rare genetic diseases. First, limiting
the number of families who can use a donor would help address the
fears of donor children found in “My Daddy’s Name is Donor.” 243
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This would minimize the concern, but not eradicate it entirely. For
true elimination of incest fears, only one family should be able to use
each donor. The limited supply of sperm donors prohibits the limitation from being so restrictive. 244 Second, if the widespread usage of
one donor’s sperm may lead to the spread of a rare disease that transfers through genes. For instance, one teenage donor child discovered
his donor father, who had fathered at least twenty-four children, has a
connective tissue disorder and a heart defect. 245 Regulating the number of families that could use a given a donor would limit the spread
of such diseases. With the registry in place to likewise prevent unknowing incestuous relationships, the United States should limit the
number of families that can use a given donor to ten, paralleling the
United Kingdom’s regulations. 246
2. No Regulation of Donation Recipient or Disclosure to Children

“My Daddy’s Name is Donor” also suggests additional regulations could positively impact the children’s psychological health. 247
Children of artificial insemination who were raised in a household
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with two parents were less likely to experience psychological problems than donor children raised by a single parent. 248 In addition,
“My Daddy’s Name is Donor” suggests full disclosure of conception
may be beneficial for the mental health of the donor children. 249
However, “My Daddy’s Name is Donor” only demonstrates correlation, not causation, between the household environment and the
children’s psychological health. 250 Therefore, the United States
should not regulate who can be a recipient of sperm donation or when
parents should tell their children about the artificial insemination.
Both of these regulations would infringe on the robust interpretation
of family privacy in the United States. 251 Similar to the anonymity
issue, without a clear causal relationship between these factors and
psychological harm to children, family privacy trumps the donor
children’s interest in such regulation.
Other countries have imposed regulations on sperm donation
recipients, but not disclosure of information to the children. 252 For
instance, Sweden only permits sperm artificial insemination for mar-
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ried or cohabitating women, and requires the consent of the spouse or
partner. 253 Switzerland’s laws are the most restrictive, permitting
sperm donation only for heterosexual married couples. 254 While regulation of the permissible sperm donor recipient is fairly common, no
country regulates when the parent must tell the child about their conception. 255
The United States should not regulate the recipients of sperm
donation or when parents should disclose the method of conception
because there is no proven causal effect between the household environment and harm to the children to overcome the parent’s right to
raise and control a family. First, the donor children have a minimal
argument for regulation, as “My Daddy’s Name is Donor” fails to
prove a causal connection. 256 Second, in the United States, parents
have a privacy right to have custody of, care for, and raise their children. 257 The United States Supreme Court stated in Troxel v. Granville, “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
253
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recognized by this Court.” 258 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the parent’s right, and it the state should
not infringe upon it unless the parent is not adequately caring for the
child. 259 Courts in the United States have upheld legislation infringing on the privacy right when the child’s health demands it, such as
cases of incest. 260 Here, such legislation would likely not survive review as it would unjustifiably infringe on the privacy right because
such factors are not proven to impact the child’s health. In this situation, as there is no clear causal connection between being raised by a
single mother or the disclosure of the method of conception and psychologically harm to the child, United States courts and legislatures
should not infringe on such a fundamental liberty interest through
regulation of those areas.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on “My Daddy’s Name is Donor,” a review of current American sperm donation practices, and a review of foreign law, I have
reached a number of proposals to revolutionize the sperm donor industry in the United States to alleviate burdens felt by donor children.
258

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
Id.
260
See, e.g., Smith v. State, 6 S.W.3d 512, 518–19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
259

2012]

MY DADDY’S NAME IS DONOR

625

However, I take greater caution than some other legal analysts in that
my proposals focus only on proven causal connections leading to the
detriment of donor children. The “My Daddy’s Name is Donor”
study identifies four problematic facets of the artificial insemination
practice. First, sperm donor children are more troubled than the general population of children their age. Second, sperm donor children
conceived by anonymous donors experience psychological problems
more than other donor children do. Third, sperm donor children
raised by single mothers experience greater difficulty than their peers
do. Finally, donor children whose parents omit the truth about their
conception encounter higher rates of psychological problems than
other donor children their age. Because these four problem areas are
inseparably intertwined, a direct causal connection between any one
factor and donor children psychological health is not yet available.
Based on this information and the competing policy concerns,
this article suggests the United States should create a national registry
of sperm donors and the resulting children. The registry should be
immediately accessible to all parents and accessible to donor children
when the children reach the age of sixteen. The age of sixteen reflects the time when donor children may begin to have fears about
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accidental incest. Every sperm donor should be required to provide
medical information, including family history to the registry. Sperm
donors should have the option of providing identifying information to
the registry, including personal and contact information. With the
adoption of the registry, the government should also limit the number
of families who can use a given sperm donor to ten. However, the
government should not regulate who may undergo artificial insemination, or when parents should tell their children about the method of
conception. These conclusions are designed to help sperm donor
children overcome the hurdles of being a donor child while not intruding on the rights of donors or potential parents when there is no
proven causation to necessitate such infringement.

